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Executive Summary
In making this  submission,  we suggest that  Australia  learn from the experiences  of other
jurisdictions,  and  avoid  some  of  the  mistakes  that  have  been  made.  In  particular,  this
involves:
● Ensuring that adequate information is available to evaluate the success of the scheme
● Ensuring that notices sent to consumers provide full and accurate information that
helps them understand their rights and options
● Limiting the potential  abuse of the system, and particularly attempts  to intimidate
consumers into paying unfair penalties through ‘speculative invoicing’
● Avoiding the potential for actual or perceived bias in the scheme’s oversight body
Key recommendations
1. Clear metrics to measure the success of  the scheme should be developed and
agreed upon before it commences.
2. A code of ethical conduct for use of the scheme that includes undertakings that:
○ Notices are issued in a good faith belief of their accuracy; and
○ Any offers to settle potential infringement suits will strictly be limited to a
compensatory amount.
3. All notices issued to consumers should:
○ Be drafted in  a public,  consultative  process,  with input from rightsholders,
ISPs, consumer groups, and legal experts;
○ Contain  comprehensive  information  about  limitations  and  exceptions  to
copyright infringement; and
○ Provide clear guidance about how consumers can contest allegations cheaply
and effectively.
4. The  scheme  should  include  safeguards  to  ensure  transparency  and  enable
rigorous public oversight. In particular, we recommend that:
○ All  notices  should  be  sent  in  an  anonymised  form to  a  clearinghouse  for
independent analysis and review of the scheme;
○ Comprehensive statistics should be compiled and made publicly available on a
continuous basis about the numbers of each type of notice received and sent
by ISPs, the outcomes of any appeals, and other relevant information.
○ Without  prejudicing  any  confidential  information,  the  results  of  audits  of
detection methodologies and accompanying reasons should be made publicly
available.
5. The  composition  of  the  Copyright  Information  Panel  Executive  Committee
should include two additional independent members.
6. In order to improve due process:
○ Any notice issued to a user should be contestable for the full period in which it
is in force;
○ The burden of proof should not lie with a consumer to prove that they did not
infringe,  especially  if  the  details  of  detection  methodology  used  is
confidential;
○ Appeals  process  should  incorporate  protection  for  natural  justice,  be
determined by independent arbitrators, and require the transparent reporting of
all decisions.
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Clear evaluation goals
Recommendation:  Clear  metrics  to  measure  the  success  of  the  scheme  should  be
developed and agreed upon before it commences.
Given the significant  expense involved in  establishing  and maintaining  this  scheme,  it  is
important  that  there are clear  metrics  for evaluating the extent  to which it  is  meeting  its
objectives.
Other jurisdictions have experienced difficulties evaluating the impact of their schemes. It is
particularly  hard  to  identify  causal  links  between  the  introduction  of  graduated  response
schemes and a reduction in infringement rates.1 With the recent launch of streaming services
such  as  Stan and  Netflix and  the  dynamic  nature  of  the  marketplace  and  products,  it  is
particularly important  that enough data is collected to be able to identify causal,  not just
correlative relationships. 
The draft Code provides that an evaluation of the scheme will be started within 18 months,
undertaken by an independent contractor with support from the Federal Government.2 The
scheme’s effectiveness is to be evaluated against the objectives of the scheme and operational
effectiveness. The current objectives of the scheme, while laudable, are incomplete. Essential
consumer issues such as the price and quality of internet access, which may be impacted by
the  scheme,  are  not  covered.  As  such,  fuller  criteria  should  be  developed  prior  to  the
commencement of the scheme These criteria should be developed in a consultative process
with input from rightsholders, ISPs and consumer representatives. Evidence required to judge
these outputs should be identified and baseline data collected before the commencement of
the scheme.
We have outlined below several factors that are of particular significance to consumers and
the wider economy.  
Availability   of legitimate digital content 
The success of the scheme should be explicitly evaluated against the availability of lawful
content with measures of price, timeliness, and consumer choices in formats and platforms.
Australia still  lags behind other countries in the ability of consumers to access legitimate
digital distribution channels. When accessing digital goods, Australians pay more,3 have less
choice  in  distribution  channels,4 are  exposed  to  substantial  delays  in  access,5 and  are
1 Rebecca Giblin, ‘Evaluating Graduated Response’ (2013) 37 Columbia Journal of Law and the Arts 147., 194. 
2 Draft Code at 4.3 ‘Evaluation Process’ specifically 4.3.1 and 4.3.2
3 House Standing Committee on Infrastructure and Communications, ‘At What Cost? IT Pricing and the 
Australia Tax’ (29 July 2013) 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/parliamentary_business/committees/house_of_representatives_committees?
url=ic/itpricing/report.htm>.
4 Angela Daly, ‘Aussies are still  paying over the odds and it’s time for ACCC action’  (16 June 2014)  The
Conversation <https  ://  theconversation  . com  / aussies  - are  - still  - paying  - over  - the  - odds  - and  - its  - time  -
for  - accc  - action  -27920>.
5 Jordi  Mckenzie  and  W  Walls,  ‘File-Sharing  and  Film  Revenues:  An 
Empirical Analysis’ [2013] The University of Sydney, Economics Working Paper Series 1, 12-13.
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sometimes denied access completely,6 as compared with other jurisdictions. The perceived
unfairness of this disparity is an important contributor to the willingness of consumers to
infringe  copyright  content.7 The  recent  launch  of  several  new services  in  the  Australian
market  is  a  positive  sign,  but  it  is  important  to  monitor  the  degree  to  which  content  is
legitimately available in Australia, and the terms upon which consumers can obtain access. 
Broadband costs and the digital divide
The benefits of the scheme need to be carefully weighed against its costs, especially if those
costs are passed onto consumers in increases in internet prices. Any such increase is likely to
further  broaden the  digital  divide  and unfairly  burden the  most  disadvantaged  sectors  of
society.8 Careful monitoring is required on an ongoing process to ensure that the scheme’s
costs are not being passed on to consumers.9
Impact on Australian creators
The impact of the scheme should be explicitly measured against tangible, monetary benefits
to Australian creators. Experience from other jurisdictions shows that it can be difficult to
determine whether reductions in rates of detected infringement results in increased revenues
for  Australian  creators.  These  measures  should  be  built  into  a  reliable  evaluation
methodology from the start of the scheme.
A commitment to ethical conduct
Recommendation:  A code  of  ethical  conduct  for  use  of  the  scheme  that  includes
undertakings that:
● Notices are issued in a good faith belief of their accuracy; and
● Any offers to settle potential infringement suits will strictly be limited to a
compensatory amount.
One of the key challenges  facing copyright  today is  the threat  of losing legitimacy. Past
efforts  to  increase  the  enforcement  of  copyright  through  severe  penalties  or  mass
infringement  suits  have  been  met  with  hostility,  leading  to  a  ‘normative  backlash’ from
6 Josh Taylor, Netflix’s Australian block keeps Quickflix going, ZDNet (1 March 2013) 
<http  ://  www  . zdnet  . com  / au  / netflixs  - australian  - block  - keeps  - quickflix  - going  -7000012006/>.
7 See Paula Dootson and Nicolas Suzor, ‘The Game of Clones and the Australia Tax : Divergent Views about  
Copyright Business Models and the Willingness of Australian Consumers to Infringe’ (2015) 38 University of 
New South Wales Law Journal 206.
8 The Australian Communications Consumer Action Network (ACCAN) notes with concern that in households 
with income of less than $40,000 internet access falls to only 57%, and they anticipate any increase in prices to 
exacerbate the digital divide. See Media Release Copyright Notice Scheme must respect consumer protections 
(20 February 2015) <https  ://  www  . accan  . org  . au  / files  / Media  %20  Releases  /150220%20  Copyright
%20  notice  %20  scheme  %20  must  %20  protect  %20  consumer  %20  protections  . pdf> 
9 Note that there is some suggestion that the French ISPs have passed on these costs to consumers by raising the 
price of their broadband services: see Drew Wilson, HADOPI Blamed for ISP Rate Hikes in France (1 January 
2011) ZeroPaid < http  ://  www  . zeropaid  . com  / news  /91800/  hadopi  - blamed  - for  - isp  - rate  - hikes  - in  -
france  />; Cheryl Sun, Here There Be Pirates …  (8 October 2014) Birman & Ride 
<http  ://  birmanride  . com  . au  / firm  / news  - articles  / here  - there  - be  - pirates  />; Mike Masnick, End Result of
HADOPI? Higher ISP Fees (3 January 2011)  TechDirt 
<https  ://  www  . techdirt  . com  / articles  /20110102/14122212488/  end  - result  - hadopi  - higher  - isp  -
fees  . shtml>. 
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consumers.10 We  endorse  the  scheme’s  specific  design  in  increasing  education  about
copyright and legal avenues to access copyright content. This must be carefully managed,
however, to ensure that the scheme is not used in ways that undermine the legitimacy of
copyright law.
The biggest  potential  for abuse of this  system is  so-called  ‘speculative  invoicing’,  where
rightsholders  contact  consumers  with  offers  to  settle  alleged  infringements  for  grossly
disproportionate amounts.11 This is dangerous for two reasons. First, the settlement figures
have little relationship to the harm suffered;12 they are unfair penalties that abuse the legal
system.  Second,  consumers  who  are  wrongly  accused  face  the  difficult  choice  between
paying up or incurring significant expense in contesting an action in court. Internationally,
courts have begun to exercise greater control over the ways that rightsholders communicate
with users in order to limit these practices.13 
In order to ensure that the Australian notice scheme is not abused, we recommend limiting
participation to rightsholders who affirmatively commit to using the scheme for legitimate
purposes. We suggest that the ability to utilise the system should be conditioned on adherence
to  a  code  of  ethical  principles.  We also  suggest  that  a  requirement  be  introduced  for
rightsholders to provide some form of undertaking that notices are made in a good faith belief
in their accuracy. Rightsholders who have been found to repeatedly abuse the system or fail
to take due care in the allegations they issue should lose the ability to utilise the scheme. 
Particularly,  the  code  should  provide  that  before  taking  steps  to  identify  consumers,
rightsholders must make an undertaking that any offer to settle a prospective suit will  be
limited to a purely compensatory amount based on the average market price of the allegedly
infringed good. It is a fundamental principle of our rule of law that penalties for breach of the
law can only be imposed through judicial proceedings.14 If it is necessary to seek additional
damages for infringement, this should be done within the context of a full judicial procedure
under section 115(4) of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). If, after the evaluation period of this
scheme, it becomes clear that a deterrence scheme is required, we strongly argue that it must
only  be  created  legislatively  with  full  public  oversight  and adequate  protections  for  due
process.
10 See  Timothy  L.  Yim,  ‘Normative  Avoision:  Revising  the  Copyright  Alert  System  to  Avoid  Normative
Backlash’ (2014) 6 Hastings Science and Technology Law Journal 1; Ben Depoorter, Alain Van Hiel and Sven
Vanneste, ‘Copyright Backlash’ (2010) 84 Southern California Law Review 1251.
11 Patrick Collins. Inc, v John Doe 1 , 2012 US Dist LEXIS 71122 (ED NY, 2013), 5.
12 Golden Eye (International) Ltd v Telefonica UK Ltd [2010] EWHC 723 (Ch), [137].
13 Golden Eye (International) Ltd v Telefonica UK Ltd [2010] EWHC 723 (Ch), [36]; Voltage Pictures LLC v
John Doe (2014) 240 A.C.W.S (3d) 964. [133].
14 Nicolas Suzor and Brian Fitzgerald, ‘The Legitimacy of Graduated Response Schemes in Copyright Law’
(2011) 34 University of New South Wales Law Journal 1.
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Ensuring transparency
Recommendation: The scheme should include safeguards to ensure transparency and
enable rigorous public oversight. In particular, we recommend that:
● All  notices  should  be  sent  in  an  anonymised  form  to  a  clearinghouse  for
independent analysis and review of the scheme;
● Comprehensive statistics should be compiled and made publicly available on a
continuous basis about the numbers of each type of notice received and sent by
ISPs, the outcomes of any appeals, and other relevant information.
● Without  prejudicing  any  confidential  information,  the  results  of  audits  of
detection  methodologies  and  accompanying  reasons  should  be  made  publicly
available.
In order to ensure that this code is accepted as legitimate, its operation must be transparent
and accountable to the public. The experience of the New Zealand Government highlights the
potentially disastrous effects of failing to build transparency into a copyright notice scheme.
When asked for  an update  on the  progress  of  its  evaluation  of  the  NZ Scheme,  the NZ
Ministry of Business, Innovation & Employment recently noted that it has not been able to
assess the volume of notices sent through the scheme:
“Since  2012  we  have  monitored  the  effectiveness  of  the  regime  by  maintaining
regular  contact  with  stakeholders,  including  the  rights  owners,  the  [ISPs]   and
InternetNZ. We do not have access to the volume of notices that have been issued
under  the  regime  because  that  information  is  commercially  sensitive  to  the
stakeholders.”15 
This is an unacceptable situation that must be avoided. Without clear data, no evaluation of
the scheme can be comprehensive. It is not appropriate that the important task of evaluation
be left to those with a direct interest in some aspect of the scheme. 
We recommend that all notices sent to ISPs are anonymised and provided to a public and
independent  repository  or  clearinghouse.  This  transparency  is  important  to  enable
independent review and academic analysis of the operation of the scheme and to inform the
future  development  of  regulatory  policy.  It  will  also  facilitate  public  confidence  in  the
operation of the scheme. 
We also recommend that reviews of detection methodologies be made publicly available and
that sufficient data is made available to enable ongoing oversight of efficacy in practice. The
overseas experience suggests that infringement detection systems are vulnerable to technical
15 Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment spokesperson, email dated 19 March 2015.
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errors16 and abuse.17 In the absence of an independent  legal examination of the evidence,
rightsholders have little incentive to take care when collecting data and issuing warnings.18
Content of notices to consumers
Recommendation: All notices issued to consumers should:
● Be drafted in a public, consultative process, with input from rightsholders, ISPs,
consumer groups, and legal experts;
● Contain  comprehensive  information  about  limitations  and  exceptions  to
copyright infringement; and
● Provide clear guidance about how consumers can contest allegations cheaply and
effectively.
In order to ensure that this scheme is best able to fulfil its educational goals, the content of
notices sent to consumers should be carefully designed and regulated. This scheme should
include safeguards to ensure that the notices sent to consumers are clear, contain accurate
information,  and  provide  comprehensive  information  about  consumers’  rights,  including
potential grounds for appeal. The notices sent to consumers should be developed through a
consensus based process in conjunction with rightsholders, ISPs, and consumer groups, and
agreed upon by the ACMA. 
Because copyright law is complex, there is a strong risk that without adequate information
consumers  may  not  take  appropriate  steps  to  protect  their  interests.  It  is  fundamentally
important that education notices sent to consumers provide information not just about the
subsistence and ownership of copyright  in the contested material,  but also about relevant
exceptions and defences to infringement that may apply to the consumer’s use. As far as
possible, consumers should be able to understand this information without the need to seek
legal advice.
Care must be taken to ensure that notices are drafted with these considerations in mind. The
standard forms should undergo a drafting process where early drafts are made available to the
public for comment and consultation. This process will ensure accountability and competitive
neutrality in the drafting of the forms and will promote public confidence in the process. The
international experience suggests that this is a vital safeguard — the notices issued under the
US Copyright  Alert  Scheme,  for  example,  are  deficient  in  failing  to  fully  articulate  the
16 See e.g. Cowdroy J’s finding of the unreliability of 350 daily “robot” notices sent to iiNet from the United
States over several years: Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Ltd (2010) 263 ALR 215, 257. In the USA, a prime
example is the Recording Industry Association of America in the Napster litigation suing certain individuals for
illegal  downloading,  despite  one of  whom being  deceased,  and  another  whose  computer  was  incapable  of
operating the software to illegally download music as alleged. 
17 This behaviour is, unfortunately, all too common in non-judicial copyright processes; a 2006 study shows that
over 40 per cent of copyright takedown notices issued to Google under the DMCA are issued against business
competitors, and over 20 per cent of those contained substantively questionable claims: Jennifer M Urban and
Laura Quilter, ‘Efficient  Process or “Chilling Effects”? Takedown Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act’ (2006) 22 Santa Clara Computer & High Technology Law Journal 621, 655, 684.
18 Peter Yu, ‘The Graduated Response’ (2010) 62 Florida Law Review 1373, 1391–2.
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defences and limitations to copyright law that consumers are able to rely on.19 This gives a
misleading impression to consumers and has the effect of arbitrarily limiting the reasons for
which a consumer can challenge a notice. 
Increased public interest representation on Copyright 
Information Panel 
Recommendation:  The  composition  of  the  Copyright  Information  Panel  Executive
Committee should include two additional independent members.
The draft  Code provides that  the Copyright  Information  Panel  Executive Committee  will
consist of five members, with two representatives appointed by rightsholders, two by ISPs
and one by the Consumer Organisation (ACCAN). This composition does not adequately
reflect  the  significance  of  this  scheme  to  the  public.  Industry codes  can  be  an  effective
mechanism to regulate industries, but in order to ensure that they reflect the public interest, it
is important to empower public interest groups to monitor their performance.20 
Given the vital role of the Copyright Information Panel Executive Committee in overseeing
this scheme, we recommend that its composition be reviewed to better include public interest
groups.  Because  this  scheme is  specifically  aimed  at  regulating  consumer  behaviour,  we
suggest that a clear plurality of representatives  on this panel  are selected from consumer
groups and independent members with no actual or perceived conflict of interest. We suggest
that  the  composition  and appointment  of  Committee  members  could  be  carried  out  in  a
similar  process  to  that  of  the  Classification  Board,  in  order  to  ensure  that  it  is  broadly
representative of the Australian community and that members are transparently appointed on
merit.21 
This is an important step to avoid the difficulties faced by the US Copyright Alert Scheme.
Under  that  scheme,  the  Center  for  Copyright  Information  (CCI)  is  responsible  for  the
selection of an independent firm to engage in an auditing role.22 This panel appointed an
auditing firm that was found to be compromised in their independance due to their links to
the RIAA.23 
19 Annemarie Bridy, ‘Graduated Response American Style: “Six Strikes” Measured Against Five Norms’ (2012)
23 Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal 1, 33.
20 Ian  Ayres  and John Braithwaite,  Responsive  Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (Oxford
University Press, 1992).
21 See Australian Classification Board, Guidelines for the Selection of Members of the Classification Board 
(2008) Commonwealth of Australia 
<http  ://  www  . classification  . gov  . au  / About  / Documents  / O  _  Guidelines  %20  for  %20  the
%20  Selection  %20  of  %20  Members  %20  of  %20  the  %20  Classification  %20  Board  %20-%20  June
%202008.  pdf>, incorporating the Merit and Transparency procedures issued by the Australian Public Service 
Commission.
22 Annemarie Bridy, “Graduated Response American Style: “Six Strikes” measured against five norms”
23 Jill Lesser, CCI Recommits to Independent Evaluation of Content Methodology, Ctr. for Copyight Info., Oct.
30, 2012, http  ://  www  . copyrightinformation  . org  / node  /712
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Challenges to notices, due process, and adjudication 
Recommendation: In order to improve due process:
● Any notice issued to a user should be contestable for the full period in which it is
in force;
● The burden of proof should not lie with a consumer to prove that they did not
infringe, especially if the details of detection methodology used is confidential;
● Appeals process should incorporate protection for natural justice, be determined
by  independent  arbitrators,  and  require  the  transparent  reporting  of  all
decisions.
First, we submit that there is no good reason to limit the appeal period to 28 days after the
issue of  a Final Notice. By this time, much of the evidence that would exculpate an Account
Holder may be lost. 
Second,  it  is  dangerous  to  reverse  the  onus  of  proof  on  Account  Holders,  and  it  is
unacceptable to put in place a system that requires users to bear the onus of proof without the
requisite information to actually contest that allegation. It is not always clear how, exactly, an
Account Holder can prove a negative in these circumstances. This leaves consumers with a
high responsibility to provide evidence to contest spurious requests.24 Because details of the
audits  are confidential,  the Account Holder does not have access to all  the material  facts
necessary to properly challenge allegations. This is dangerous; in Ireland, for example,  in
2011, it was found that 390 subscribers were misidentified as infringers due to what was
described as a “minor technical issue” on Eircom’s part.25  We also note that the onus of proof
effectively undermines the principle of personal responsibility in copyright law. There is no
obligation under Australian law for an account holder to monitor the actions of other people
using  their  networks,  and  no  general  law  principles  hold  account  holders  automatically
responsible for unlawful uses of their networks. 
Third, appeals process should incorporate strong protections for natural justice. While this is
an industry code, the ultimate goal is a public one: to regulate the behaviour of individuals.
As a public system,  users have a legitimate  expectation that  decisions will  be made in a
legitimate, accountable, transparent, and procedurally fair manner.26 As a first step to achieve
this, we recommended that independent and accredited arbitrators be engaged to determine
the outcome of any challenges. This is crucial in order to protect consumers’ rights relating to
due process, minimise any perceptions of bias in the process, and promote consumer trust in
the  system.  Importantly,  in  order  to  ensure  that  consumers  are  well  informed  in  these
processes, the outcomes and reasons of all decisions should be published and accessible. This
is particularly important in order to limit the structural bias of a ‘repeat player effect’ in these
proceedings.
24 As, for example, the defendant in  Malibu Media, LLC  v.  Roberto Roldan, 8:13-cv-03007-JSM-TBM, who
was required to adduce a great deal of evidence to demonstrate that he was misidentified by the plaintiff, despite
not residing at the address of the internet connection for over two years.
25 EMI Records v Data Protection Commissioner [2012] IEHC 264.
26 Nicolas Suzor and Brian Fitzgerald, ‘The Legitimacy of Graduated Response Schemes in Copyright Law’
(2011) 34 University of New South Wales Law Journal 1.
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